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The Applicability of Deepening Insolvency as a Claim Against
the Management of Nonprofit Corporations
Benjamin Gerber*
Even when a corporation is insolvent, its corporate property may
have value. The fraudulent and concealed incurrence of debt can
damage that value . . . . The very threat of bankruptcy, brought
about through fraudulent debt, can shake the confidence of parties
dealing with the corporation, calling into question its ability to per-
form, thereby damaging [corporate] assets, the value of which often
depends on the performance of other parties. . . . [P]rolonging an
insolvent corporation's life through bad debt may simply cause the
dissipation of corporate assets.
These harms can be averted, and the value within an insolvent
corporation salvaged, if the corporation is dissolved in a timely
manner, rather than kept afloat with spurious debt.'
I. INTRODUCTION
As courts have expanded the boundaries of corporate manager lia-
bility, deepening insolvency as a claim for relief has gained recogni-
tion. Since its inception, detractors of deepening insolvency have
believed that a distressed corporation's acquisition of additional debt
causes negligible harm to its operation and beneficiaries. It is this
Note's goal to demonstrate that this belief is wrong as applied to a
nonprofit corporation. Through the discussion of the Third Circuit's
decision in In re Lemington Home for the Aged, precedent, existing
claims, and policy, this Note will show that a viable deepening insol-
vency claim is necessary to remedy the harms created by the wrongful
prolongation of a distressed nonprofit corporation.
A well-run assisted living center is a busy place: employees lead re-
sidents in exercise programs, organize social activities, serve meals,
spend time with residents, and provide security. Residents and their
families entrust employees of these facilities to care for individuals
that desire, or require, other people to supervise and manage their
lives each day. When managers of such facilities execute their fiscal
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, May 2013; B.S., Business Economics
and Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business, May 2008.
1. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 349-50 (3d
Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
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responsibilities in a negligent or fraudulent manner, their corporate
actions jeopardize the facility and its residents' lives. The Lemington
Home for the Aged (the Home) experienced this precise situation;
however, a deepening insolvency claim prevented its directors and of-
ficers from immunity.
Part II of this Note discusses prior interpretations of deepening in-
solvency. Part III explores the In re Lemington Home for the Aged
decision in which the Third Circuit implicitly ruled that nonprofit di-
rectors should be subject to deepening insolvency as a theory of liabil-
ity. Part IV argues that the existing differences between for-profit and
nonprofit corporations require that a claim of deepening insolvency
fill the gap that has allowed nonprofit directors and officers to abuse
their fiduciary duties without retribution. Part V expands on deepen-
ing insolvency's impact on the beneficiaries of nonprofit corporations.
Finally, in Part VI, this Note concludes that the Third Circuit's holding
should place nonprofit directors in a more vulnerable position because
current liability claims cannot rectify the consequences of a director-
prolonged nonprofit corporation.
II. BACKGROUND
Claims of deepening insolvency have had a presence in corporate
litigation for over thirty years.2 Although the claim is a question of
state law,3 it often arises in bankruptcy proceedings. 4 Part II(A)
traces the development of deepening insolvency. Part II(B) will show
that the courts have many interpretations of the claim. Lastly, Part
II(C) will review the elements necessary to bring a valid claim of
deepening insolvency.
Before tracing the development of deepening insolvency, it is im-
portant to understand the basic definitions of insolvency, a corpora-
tion's path to insolvency, and the defenses afforded to corporate
management if insolvency leads to litigation. Two commonly accepted
tests of insolvency are the balance sheet test and the equity test.5
2. See, e.g., Bloor v. Dansker (In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig.), 523 F. Supp.
533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
3. Elizabeth V. Tanis & Jennifer D. Fease, Emerging Issues in Deepening Insolvency Claims,
42 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIEs REG. 239, 240 (2009).
4. See generally Sara E. Apel, Comment, In Too Deep: Why the Federal Courts Should Not
Recognize Deepening Insolvency as a Cause of Action, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 85 (2008)
(noting that trustees and creditor committees assert claims of deepening insolvency when they
believe boards of directors have fraudulently prolonged an already insolvent corporation's life,
forcing it to file bankruptcy).
5. 15A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPO-
RATIONS § 7360 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2012).
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Under the balance sheet test, a corporation is insolvent if its debts
are greater than its assets at fair market value.6 The Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 adopted this approach.7 The equity test refers to insolvency as
the inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they become due in
the usual course of business.8 Some commentators consider the eq-
uity test so expansive that insolvency may refer to a debtor's general
inability to meet fiscal obligations as they mature. 9 It does not matter
that a corporation's assets exceed its liabilities; a corporation becomes
insolvent when its assets cannot satisfy its debt obligations.10 In the
absence of an accepted standard within a particular jurisdiction, courts
may apply either test to determine when a corporation has entered the
zone of insolvency."
A. Business Tort Claims and Insolvency
Many scenarios may cause a corporation to become insolvent. A
corporation may become insolvent because of a decrease in revenue,
an increase in expenses through negligent or fraudulent management,
or poor industry conditions.12 In general, a board of directors owes a
duty of care, good faith, and loyalty,' 3 but when a corporation be-
6. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(32)(A) (West 2006). For example, a coffee shop is insolvent when the
money owed to its coffee bean suppliers is greater than its expected income from selling all of its
coffee at a competitive price.
7. John C. McCoid II, The Occasion for Involuntary Bankruptcy, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 196
(1987) (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(31)).
8. FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 5, § 7360.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Nancy A. Peterman & Sherri Morissette, Directors' Duties in the Zone of Insolvency:
The Quandary of the Nonprofit Corp., 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2004, at 12.
12. John T. Goodwin, The Doctrine of Deepening Insolvency in Bankruptcy 4 (Dec. 2, 2008)
(unpublished comment), available at http://lawlib.wlu.edu/lexopus/works/332-1.pdf; see also
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.30 (2007) (noting that a corporate director must discharge its duties
in good faith and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation whether or not the director has the required knowledge). Compare Ramesh K.S.
Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in
a Financially-Distressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53 (1996) (explaining that corporations that have
directors who follow such standards can still become insolvent from operational inefficiencies
and consumer preference), with Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law's "Holy Grail": Reconciling
Theory and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REv. 921 (2011) (noting that direc-
tors that fail to act in the best interests of the corporation have been found liable for failing to
perform their corporate duties).
13. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5712 (West 2011). "A director . .. shall perform his duties as a
director, including his duties as a member of any committee of the board upon which he may
serve, in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence, as a person of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances." Id. (emphasis added).
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comes insolvent, the directors' fiduciary duties shift from its stock-
holders and other equity owners to its creditors. 14
If a corporation's capital contributors wish to sue its directors for a
breach of fiduciary duty, they must overcome the business judgment
rule and must have not been part of the directors' fraud or wrongdo-
ing (also known as the directors' in pari delicto defense). Under the
business judgment rule, courts will not question a business decision
absent evidence of abuse of discretion.15 Courts operate under the
presumption that directors will act on an informed basis, in good faith,
and in the honest belief that their decisions are for the good of the
corporation. 16 Nonetheless, a plaintiff has the burden to rebut this
presumption by proving that the directors (1) failed to take action, (2)
made an uninformed decision, (3) made a decision that was not in
good faith, or (4) had a financial interest in the outcome of the
decision.' 7
Even if a plaintiff successfully rebuts the presumption offered by
the business judgment rule, the doctrine of in pari delicto may still
protect the defendant. In pari delicto is a significant barrier to suc-
cessfully alleging tortious conduct against corporate management.' 8
Unlike the business judgment rule, a corporate defendant must af-
firmatively assert in pari delicto to prevent the plaintiff from recover-
ing damages.19 It also precludes plaintiff trustees and creditor
committees from filing suit if they have benefited from director mal-
14. Richard M. Cieri & Michael J. Riela, Protecting Directors and Officers of Corporations
That Are Insolvent or in the Zone or Vicinity of Insolvency: Important Considerations, Practical
Solutions, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 295, 300 (2004) (noting that creditors have a great inter-
est in the value of a corporation's assets because it is from these assets that they will be paid).
15. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266-67 (Del. 2000) (noting that shareholders'
mere disagreement cannot serve as grounds for imposing liability).
16. Id. at 251.
17. See generally id. (explaining that the plaintiff did not rebut the presumption).
18. See Amelia Toy Rudolph et al., Invoking in Pari Delicto to Bar Accountant Liability Ac-
tions Brought by Trustees and Receivers, WL ST004 ALI-ABA 75, 77 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Sept. 15-16, 2011) (stating that the defense is a "complete bar to an action asserted by a
plaintiff who is equally at fault for the wrongdoing giving rise to the plaintiff's claim").
19. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 329 (Pa. 2010) ("[T]he plaintiff [must] be
an active, voluntary participant in the wrongful conduct or transaction(s) for which it seeks re-
dress, and bear substantially equal [or greater] responsibility for the underlying illegality as com-
pared to the defendant." (internal quotation marks omitted)), vacated on remand, 607 F.3d 346
(3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the Third Circuit vacated the initial judgment in favor of the
third-party auditor because the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had recently clarified the test of
imputation and the district court did not consider whether the auditor dealt with the foundation
in good faith).
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feasance. 20 However, the adverse interest exception 2' refutes the in
pari delicto defense if the alleged wrongdoing did not benefit the
plaintiff.22
B. The Precedent of Deepening Insolvency
Deepening insolvency claims are relatively new compared to claims
for breach of fiduciary duty and other traditional business torts. The
court in In re Investors Funding Corporation of New York Securities
Litigation inadvertently laid the groundwork for a deepening insol-
vency claim.23 In the case, plaintiff trustees sued a corporation's audi-
tor for creating a false image of financial health through a series of
sham transactions designed to show artificial profits and conceal
losses.24 The auditor, in its defense, argued that any fraud perpetrated
actually benefited the trustees by allowing the corporation to continue
operations past the point of insolvency.25 The court rejected the audi-
tor's argument and reasoned that "[a] corporation is not a biological
entity for which it can be presumed that any act which extends its
existence is beneficial to it."26 Thus, it held that the prolonged sol-
vency of the debtor solely benefited the auditor.27 By recognizing the
dynamic relationship between a corporation and its financial contribu-
tors, the court created the foundation for deepening insolvency. 28
Soon after the Southern District of New York established deepen-
ing insolvency's base, the Seventh Circuit allowed a deepening insol-
vency claim against directors and officers that had prolonged the life
of an insolvent corporation, thereby deepening its debt.29 The Direc-
tor of the Illinois Department of Insurance sued the directors of an
insurance corporation because the corporate directors allowed the in-
20. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 356
(3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the trustee can only assert actions available by the debtor or creditor,
and it is subject to the same defenses as could have been asserted by the corporation).
21. "[C]ourts impute the fraud of an officer to a corporation when the officer commits the
fraud (1) in the course of his employment, and (2) to the benefit of the corporation." Id. at 358
(setting a test to determine whether adverse interest is present).
22. Allegheny, 989 A.2d at 333 ("[W]here an agent acts in his own interest, and to the corpora-
tion's detriment, imputation generally will not apply.").
23. See Bloor v. Dansker (In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig.), 523 F. Supp. 533,
541 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that a false financial picture enabled the corporation's management
"to raise capital for [its] further plundering").
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. at 541 (citing the claim as a
justification for recognizing an "adverse interest" exception).
29. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983).
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solvent insurance corporation to take on an additional liability that
consequently damaged the corporation, its policyholders, and credi-
tors.30 In denying the directors' motion to dismiss, the court stated
that the prolongation of corporate life is not a benefit to corporate
shareholders because they are last in line for recovery in bankruptcy
liquidation.3 1
Although deepening insolvency has a history rich in finding director
liability, the courts have inconsistently applied this tort. Courts have
treated deepening insolvency inconsistently because of the difficulty
harmonizing the varying judicial decisions with the Bankruptcy Code
and other law.32 Court determinations on deepening insolvency dif-
fer: some find it a valid independent claim for relief, some find it valid
only for measuring damages, and still others refuse to recognize it.
For example, the Western District of Pennsylvania has held deepen-
ing insolvency a valid independent claim where a third-party account-
ing firm knowingly aided corporate directors in misstating a
Pennsylvania nonprofit's financial condition.33 In another instance,
the Southern District of New York found deepening insolvency to be a
valid measure of damages where plaintiff nonprofit corporation relied
on financial misstatements that prevented it from filing for bankruptcy
earlier.34 In addition, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Dela-
ware has held deepening insolvency to be a valid claim where a syndi-
cate of lenders extended a business an additional two years under the
fraudulent guise of renegotiating financial covenants.35
However, another court has held that deepening insolvency was not
a valid theory of damages for corporate malpractice. 36 The Delaware
30. Id. at 1345.
31. Id. at 1348.
32. See Tanis & Fease, supra note 3, at 240; see also TaeRa K. Franklin, Deepening Insolvency:
What It Is and Why It Should Prevail, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 435, 443 (2006) (noting that federal
courts are left to determine and infer how the relevant state courts would rule).
33. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, No. 2:00cv684, 2007 WL 141059, at *12, *15 (W.D. Pa.
Jan. 17, 2007), certifying question to No. 07-1397, 2008 WL 3895559 (3d Cir. July 1, 2008), answer-
ing certified question 989 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2010).
34. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 560, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[W]hile the incur-
rence of debt by itself cannot deepen a company's insolvency, the [c]ourt is not prepared to
conclude that it never can cause injury to an insolvent company."), affg sub nom. Pappas v.
Bank of Am. Corp., 309 F. App'x 536 (2d Cir. 2009). However, the court found that the plain-
tiffs did not adequately allege the required fraud. Id. at 581-87.
35. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (In re Exide Techs.,
Inc.), 299 B.R. 732, 750-52 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
36. See Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir.
2006) (concluding that proof of negligence was not sufficient to bring a claim for deepening
insolvency).
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Court of Chancery has stated that it does not recognize deepening
insolvency as an independent claim because suits that allege fraud and
a breach of fiduciary duty already protect investors and provide insu-
lation to directors in the zone of insolvency.37 A Texas bankruptcy
court has followed Delaware's belief that deepening insolvency is du-
plicative and collapses other established business torts.38
Although deepening insolvency's precedent differs in application,
most scholars agree that the most notable opinion on deepening insol-
vency is the decision from Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
v. R.F. Lafferty & Co. 3 9
In Lafferty, the Third Circuit held that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court could recognize the tort of deepening insolvency as an indepen-
dent claim. 40 The issue involved claims that a third party fraudulently
induced two lease financing corporations to issue fraudulent debt cer-
tificates that resulted in deepening the corporations' insolvency and
forcing them into bankruptcy.41 The plaintiff committee of creditors
brought claims against the defendant directors and asserted that they
had mismanaged the corporation and breached their fiduciary duties
to its debtors by failing to supervise and oversee the corporations'
affairs.42
At the time of this case, Pennsylvania had not yet addressed deep-
ening insolvency.43 The court stated that Pennsylvania's highest court
37. See Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 906 A.2d 168, 205 (Del. Ch. 2006).
38. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of VarTec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin.
Coop. (In re VarTec Telecom Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) ("Put more
bluntly, if you honestly treat deepening insolvency as a tort, it collapses into already existing
torts, be it a breach of fiduciary duty . .. accounting malpractice . . . or some other cause of
action." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Sabin Willett, The Shallows of Deepening Insolvency, 60 Bus. LAw. 549, 564
(2005) (recognizing that Lafferty is perhaps the leading decision on deepening insolvency today);
Lauren Colasacco, Note, Where Were the Accountants? Deepening Insolvency as a Means of
Ensuring Accountants' Presence when Corporate Turmoil Materializes, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
793, 827 (2009) (noting that Lafferty is the pivotal case that defined deepening insolvency as an
independent tort); Goodwin, supra note 12, at 21 ("[T]he Lafferty decision has been one of the
most influential deepening insolvency cases, and has frequently been cited as allowing deepening
insolvency theory both as a cause of action, and as a theory of harm."); Edward E. Neiger, Third
Circuit Limits Scope of Liability for "Deepening Insolvency", BANKR. BULL., Aug. 2006, at
4, available at http://www.weil.com/wgm/cwgmhomep.nsf/Files/BBAug06/$file/BBAugo6.pdf
("Most complaints asserting a claim of deepening insolvency cite Lafferty either as binding or
persuasive precedent.").
40. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir.
2001) (noting that deepening insolvency is "an injury to the Debtors' corporate property from
the fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life").
41. The lease financing corporations were incidentally involved in a Ponzi scheme as well. Id.
at 344-45.
42. Id. at 346.
43. Id. at 349.
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could accept that "deepening insolvency may give rise to a cognizable
injury" 44 because of its sound theory,45 its growing acceptance among
other courts,46 and because its "remedial theme" paralleled the princi-
ples of the state's jurisprudence. 47 Although the court never articu-
lated the elements or legal standards for the claim,48 Lafferty is the
modern standard for deepening insolvency.
C. Requirements to Bring a Successful Claim of
Deepening Insolvency
Jurisdictions that recognize deepening insolvency as a valid claim
define it as "an injury to [a debtor's] corporate property from the
fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate
life." 49 A claim of deepening insolvency requires "(1) fraud, (2) which
cause[d] the expansion of corporate debt, and (3) which prolong[ed]
the life of [a] corporation."50 The Third Circuit further expanded on
the requirement to bring a claim for deepening insolvency in a deci-
sion in which it determined that the plaintiff must establish that the
alleged tortious party caused the deepening of insolvency 51 through
44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 349-50 (noting that a corporation's property still has value even
during insolvency). The fraudulent concealment of debt can force the corporation into bank-
ruptcy, which creates operational limitations that hurt a corporation's ability to run its business.
Id. It can undermine corporate relationships of customers and investors, thus leading to the
dissipation of its assets. Id.
46. See id. at 350-51.
47. Id. at 352. One of the most venerable principles of Pennsylvania common law is that the
law provides a remedy whenever there is injury, and when directors cause damage to corporate
property, the court should recognize a cause of action for such an injury. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d
at 351 (citing Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985)) (noting that an
identifiable and compensable injury is essential to the existence of tort liability). In Lafferty, the
defendant directors challenged this rationale based on the notion that the committee had no
standing to assert claims on behalf of the creditors. Id. Although the court dismissed this asser-
tion because the committee brought its claim on behalf of the debtors, critics have dismissed this
defense, and some courts currently allow bankruptcy trustees to bring corporate malfeasance
claims on behalf of creditors. See Cieri & Riela, supra note 14, at 303-06.
48. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 360 (affirming the district court's motion to dismiss and finding
that the in pari delicto defense barred the committee from recovering for the directors' fraudu-
lent conduct).
49. Id. at 347.
50. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Foss (In re Felt Mfg. Co.), 371 B.R. 589, 621
(Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (citing Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 344).
51. Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672, 678 (3d Cir.
2006) (noting that whatever harm occurred to the plaintiff was a result of the damage caused by
the defendant).
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fraudulent conduct. 52 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has pro-
vided a general rule of fraud:
[F]raud consists in anything calculated to deceive, whether by single
act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or a suggestion of
what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by
speech or silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture. It is any arti-
fice by which a person is deceived to his disadvantage.53
Furthermore, a court must determine the causation requirement of
deepening insolvency on a case-by-case basis.54 Traditionally, tort
claims require both proximate cause and foreseeability.55 The plain-
tiff must introduce evidence that allows for the court to reasonably
conclude that the defendant's conduct was more likely than not the
cause of the harm.56 Proximate cause requires proof of exceptional or
obvious circumstances involving fraud or similar misconduct because
the success or failure of a corporation depends on multiple factors,
some of which are outside of the control of directors and officers.57
The third requirement-establishing that the expansion of debt pro-
longed the life of the corporation-is both the foundation of deepen-
ing insolvency and its most contested element because of its clash with
the business judgment rule. Deepening insolvency relies on the as-
sumption that the prolongation of a corporation's life is a legally cog-
nizable harm;58 however, this assumption conflicts with the business
judgment rule's assumption that directors should not liquidate a cor-
poration at the first sign of insolvency.59 The elements needed to es-
tablish a claim of deepening insolvency are still in development.
Although the Southern District of New York outlined a potentially
compatible hurdle for deepening insolvency by surveying the actual
use of the assets obtained during insolvency,60 common law will dic-
52. Id. at 681. The court in In re CitX Corp. noted Lafferty's definition of "the injury as a
fraudulent expansion of corporate debt." Id. (quoting Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 349) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
53. In re Reichert's Estate, 51 A.2d 615, 617 (Pa. 1947) (quoting Wiley v. Wirbelauer, 116 N.J.
Eq. 391, 396 (N.J. Ch. 1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. See Colasacco, supra note 39, at 858.
55. See Douglas R. Richmond et al., Lawyer Liability and the Vortex of Deepening Insolvency,
51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 127, 158-59 (2006); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs H§ 1, 29, 33
(2010). Because deepening insolvency has yet to be established as a cause of action, the courts
have not set out all of the elements required for causation. This Note acknowledges this open
field and indicates some general requirements of causation articulated by other scholars.
56. Richmond, supra note 55, at 157.
57. Id. at 158.
58. See Apel, supra note 4, at 107.
59. See id.
60. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 560, 576, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (looking to
the third-party defendant's work for the corporation to determine if it was reasonably foresee-
able that defendant knew of looting of corporate assets), affg sub nom. Pappas v. Bank of Am.
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tate its interpretation until the Supreme Court or Congress establishes
its requirements.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: IN RE LEMINGTON HOME FOR THE AGED
In the In re Lemington Home for the Aged decision, the Third Cir-
cuit determined that the Committee of Creditors (the Committee)
should not be foreclosed from bringing a deepening insolvency claim
against a nonprofit board of directors and officers.61 Further judicial
support of this decision would likely amend the expected duties of
nonprofit directors and extend the breadth of deepening insolvency as
an independent claim. Part III(A) discusses the facts of In re Lem-
ington Home for the Aged. Part III(B) reviews the proceedings of the
dispute. Part III(C) considers the rationale and explanation for the
court's holding by looking at a breach of fiduciary duty and its de-
fenses in conjunction with a deepening insolvency claim.
A. Facts of In re Lemington Home for the Aged
The Home 62 was an elderly care facility located in Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania.63 In the early 1980s, the Home merged with its parent com-
pany, Lemington Elder Care Services (Elder Care), under a single
board of directors.64 Shortly after joining Elder Care, the directors
began aggressive marketing strategies to produce an even revenue mix
of Medicare, Medicaid, and private pay to fund the Home; however,
the campaign was not successful, and the Home slipped into signifi-
cant financial trouble.65 Although private foundations tried to keep it
afloat, the Home filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on April 13, 2005,66
and the Committee sued the Home's management claiming that it
breached its fiduciary duty and deepened the Home's insolvency,
causing irreparable harm.67
Corp., 309 F. App'x 536 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Tanis & Fease, supra note 3, at 247-48. The Note
will address this approach in Part IV.
61. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the
Aged), 659 F.3d 282, 295 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the defendants fraudulently contributed to deepening the insolvency of the Home).
62. The Third Circuit's opinion often refers to the Home as the "Lemington Center." Id. at
285.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. In its first year, the Home lost $429,000. Id. The Home's total liabilities exceeded its total
assets by $1,941,959 and $1,675,397 in 2002 and 2003, respectively. In re Lemington Home for
the Aged, 659 F.3d at 286.
66. Id. at 288.
67. Id. at 285.
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During its time under Elder Care, the Home failed to meet a num-
ber of regulations that made it impossible for the Home to generate
the income necessary to operate. For example, on June 9, 2005, a
bankruptcy court directed the defendants to obtain a viability study on
its current financial condition. 68 The auditor, PrimusCare, concluded
that the Home could not operate in its current condition even though
it operated in an area with a high population of senior citizens, had
support from the local government and community, and could obtain
a significant amount of funding by collecting approximately $500,000
in its unpaid Medicare reimbursements. 69 Between affiliating with
Elder Care and filing for bankruptcy, the Home operated without a
treasurer.70 The Home also employed a part-time administrator,
which violated the Pennsylvania law that required it to employ some-
one full-time.7'
Furthermore, the Home's officers failed to maintain financial
records and take minutes at executive meetings.72 Defendant James
Shealey became the Home's chief financial officer in December
2002.73 An investigation by the Committee revealed that while
Shealey was CFO a general ledger and accounting system had not
been maintained "for some time," accounting record problems had
existed since November 2003, and no Medicare billings had been sub-
mitted since August 2004.74 The investigation concluded that
Shealey's actions resulted in a failure to submit over $450,000 of pay-
ables during one year.75 Although the directors were aware as early
as December 2004 that Shealey was not maintaining financial records,
the board continued to rely on his advice.76 In addition, the directors
did not disclose their decision to stop admitting new patients and close
68. Id. at 288.
69. Id. at 288-89.
70. In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d at 286 ("From November 2003 to January
2005, the Board position of Treasurer was vacant.").
71. Defendant Melody L. Causey was the Home's administrator from September 1997 to
March 2005. Id. at 286-87. In April or May of 2004, Causey's physicians placed her on a part-
time work status that required her to be absent from the home for six to eight weeks at a time.
Id. at 286. The directors did not hire a replacement or substitute until March 2005 even though
the State of Pennsylvania required the Home to employ a full-time administrator. Id. at 287.
72. Id. at 287 (stating that the administrator admitted that minutes were never kept during
executive meetings at which compensation was discussed and that the only evidence of decisions
were handwritten notes).
73. In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d at 286.
74. Id. at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at 291.
76. Id. at 287.
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the Home.77 Moreover, "[t]hese troubling circumstances were further
exacerbated by alleged efforts to transfer the Home's principal chari-
table asset to an affiliated entity that had the same board of
directors."78
B. Procedural History
On April 13, 2005, the Home filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy petition, and two weeks later, the bankruptcy court appointed
the Committee. 79 After no entity expressed interest in funding or ac-
quiring the Home, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania approved closure of the Home and the transfer of its
residents to other facilities. 0 The Committee8 and a third party re-
vealed financial and operational problems from an investigation into
the board's actions.82 On November 27, 2005, the Committee filed
suit against the directors and officers.83 Subsequently, the Committee
amended its complaint and asserted causes of action for breach of the
defendants' fiduciary duty of care and deepening insolvency.84
The Committee alleged that the directors, by failing to supervise the
officers who were grossly negligent with the Home's financial infor-
mation and proximately caused the unnecessary bankruptcy filing,85
77. Id. (noting that at a January 6, 2005 meeting the board voted to close the Home and
agreed to stop admitting new patients to the home effective immediately).
78. Joao F. Magalhaes & Adam D. Wolper, The Sword and the Shield: More on the Old Tale
of Deepening Insolvency and in Pari Delicto Doctrine, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2011/Jan. 2012,
at *74-75; see In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d at 287-88 ("Handwritten notes from
a Board meeting held on March 15, 2005 indicate discussion of plans to transfer the Home's
principal charitable asset, the Lemington Home Fund, held by the Pittsburgh Foundation, to
Lemington Elder Care, an affiliated entity. The members of the Home's Board were also direc-
tors of Lemington Elder Care.... On March 24, 2005, a document called the Lemington Elder
Care Transition Action Plan was created, which, among other things, provided for the Lem-
ington Elder Services restructuring process, to [cilose Lemington Nursing Home and Assisted
Living Facilities, [o]btain funding to assist with the transition and restructuring of Lemington
Elder Care, [e]nlist all possible selling options of the Lemington Nursing Home and Assisted
Living Facility, [c]onduct Bankruptcy Filing of Lemington Nursing Home & Assisted Living En-
tities, and [riestructure Lemington Elder Care to include Community Services." (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
79. In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d at 287-88 (noting that the directors consid-
ered filing for bankruptcy or restructuring the Home, but decided to close the home instead).
80. Id. at 289.
81. The Lemington creditors investigated the Home's financial situation in May 2005. Id. at
288.
82. The bankruptcy court hired PrimusCare to obtain a viability study of the Home in June
2005. See id.
83. Id.
84. In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d at 289.
85. See id. at 291.
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breached their duty of care. 6 The Committee also claimed that the
directors breached their duty of care when they stopped admitting
new patients because, according to another third-party report, the
Home could have continued operations in the current market.87
Lastly, the Committee claimed that the defendants' fraudulent actions
and omissions resulted in the deepening insolvency of the Home.88
Nonetheless, the district court granted the defendants' joint motion
for summary judgment.89 The district court reasoned that the Com-
mittee's claim did not have enough facts to rebut the presumption of
the business judgment rule. 0 In addition, the court concluded that
there was not enough evidence to prove that the officers acted with
reckless disregard or gross negligence in discharging their duties,91
and it found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the fraud
claims required for deepening insolvency.92 The district court stated
that a reasonable trier of fact would be able to find that the defend-
ants' actions93 amounted only to negligence. 94
C. The Third Circuit's Opinion in In re Lemington
Home for the Aged
On appeal by the Committee, the Third Circuit vacated the district
court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the issues for fur-
ther determination after concluding that genuine issues of material
fact existed concerning the directors' self-dealing and fraud.95
86. See id. at 288-89.
87. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors ex rel. Lemington Home for the Aged v. Baldwin,
No. 10cv800, 2010 WL 4275252, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2010), vacated, 659 F.3d 282 (3d Cir.
2011); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the auditor's investigation).
88. Baldwin, 2010 WL 4275252, at *12.
89. Id.; see also In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d at 289 (stating that the directors
and officers filed a joint motion for summary judgment).
90. Baldwin, 2010 WL 4275252, at *12.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (alleging that the defendants stopped admitting patients to the Home causing it finan-
cial harm, paid attorney and accountant fees to shift resources to Elder Care, failed to collect
over $400,000 in Medicare reimbursements, misrepresented to the bankruptcy court that they
were pursuing a purchaser for the Home when they were not, and concealed the misuse of the
Home's funds by not maintaining accurate financial records).
94. Id.
95. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the Aged),
659 F.3d 282, 295 (3d Cir. 2011).
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1. Genuine Issues of Fact Existed as to Defendants' Self-Dealing
The Third Circuit did not find that the business judgment rule and
the doctrine of in pari delicto shielded the defendants from liability.96
The court reasoned that (1) the two occupant deaths, (2) the failure to
maintain adequate financial records, (3) the directors' knowledge that
the Home's administrator was not working full-time, and (4) the ne-
glected opportunities for success were enough to show that the direc-
tors and officers had breached their duty of care. 97 It further found
that summary judgment was not appropriate with respect to the busi-
ness judgment rule because the administrator's and CFO's actions
amounted to a dispute of material fact as to whether they acted with
the competence and reasonable diligence required to support the pre-
sumption offered by the business judgment rule.98 In addition, the
Third Circuit found that the adverse interest exception presented a
genuine issue of material fact 99 because the directors and officers were
"simultaneously affiliated with both the Home and Lemington Elder
Care, and thus stood to benefit from a transfer of the Home's princi-
pal charitable asset to Lemington Elder Care." 00
2. Defendants' Active Omissions and Silence Constituted Fraud
The Third Circuit also concluded that summary judgment was inap-
propriate with respect to the Home's deepening insolvency claim.101
Because the board delayed its bankruptcy filing for four months,102 it
was silent in its intention to do so, 03 and because the officers contin-
96. Id. at 291.
97. Id. CFO Shealey's failure to maintain financial records, Administrator Causey's failure to
adequately oversee the Home, and the directors' plan to divert the Home's assets to Elder Care
were sufficient evidence to conclude a breach of the duty of loyalty as well. Id.
98. See id. at 292.
99. The "adverse interest" exception applies if an agent of the principal, although purportedly
acting for its principal, abandons its principal's interest and commits fraud for his own benefit.
Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, "Deepening Insolvency" as Cause of Action in Tort, 23
A.L.R. 6th 457 (2007).
100. In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d at 293. The court cited four factual conten-
tions raised by the Committee: (1) the officers and directors had been simultaneously affiliated
with both the Home and Elder Care, (2) Shealey had served as a trustee of another potential
purchaser, (3) Causey had not accepted a recommendation that she be replaced, and (4) Shealey
had failed to properly maintain financial records. See id.
101. Id. at 295.
102. Id.
103. In Pennsylvania, "fraud consists in anything calculated to deceive ... whether it be by
direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture." In re
Reichert's Estate, 51 A.2d 615, 617 (Pa. 1947). Additional evidence of a letter dated March 30,
2005 to the Home's health insurance provider advising them that employee health care coverage
was needed for sixty more days along with the delayed bankruptcy filing created an issue of
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ued to breach their fiduciary duties until the Home filed for bank-
ruptcy,'" the court found a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the defendants' fraudulent actions contributed to the deepen-
ing of the Home's insolvency. 105
The Third Circuit did not specifically comment on the viability of
the Committee's deepening insolvency claim, 0 6 but its reversal of
summary judgment indicated that deepening insolvency was a cogni-
zable claim for relief.107
IV. ANALYSIS
In reversing the district court's decision, the Third Circuit was
obliged to follow precedent,108 but it implied that deepening insol-
vency could be used as an independent claim against the management
of nonprofit corporations.109 The In re Lemington Home for the Aged
decision reveals more insight on the scope of a deepening insolvency
claim than the sufficiency of the defendants' malfeasance. If the Third
Circuit had the opportunity to evaluate the viability of the Commit-
tee's claim, it would find that deepening insolvency should be an inde-
pendent claim against the management of a nonprofit corporation for
two reasons. First, the directorial obligations of a nonprofit corpora-
tion are different from those of a for-profit corporation. Second, al-
though critics have condemned Lafferty's reasoning as applied to for-
profit corporations, Lafferty's stated harms exist within the operation
of a nonprofit corporation.
material fact that the directors consciously defrauded the Home's creditors. See In re Lemington
Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d at 295.
104. The officers continued commingling of funds and the plan to transfer all assets to Elder
Care, failed to collect Medicare receivables, and continued to do business with vendors even
though the Home was insolvent. In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d at 295.
105. See id.
106. The Third Circuit was addressing only the appeal from the grant of summary judgment
from the district court. See id. at 290.
107. The court pointed out that neither party "argued that the concept of deepening insol-
vency may not apply to, or may involve a different standard for, a non-profit corporation" and
would not address the issue. Id. at 294 n.6.
108. "[W]e are bound in our decision to follow Lafferty, which recognizes deepening insol-
vency as an independent cause of action in Pennsylvania." Id.
109. Although the court was obligated to follow the Lafferty precedent, by reversing the dis-
trict court's finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the deepening insol-
vency claim, the Third Circuit did not preclude the Committee from claiming deepening
insolvency in the suit. See In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d at 294 n.6.
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A. Organizational Differences Between Nonprofit and For-Profit
Corporations Create Differences in Their Respective
Directors' Duties
Courts should evaluate the actions of directors of a nonprofit corpo-
ration differently than directors of a for-profit corporation because
their respective duties of care differ. The duty of care consists of two
distinct requirements: director oversight and decision-making.1 0 To
satisfy the oversight requirement, a director must make a reasonable
inquiry into potential issues that a corporation may encounter and
must continuously monitor corporate direction."' Director oversight
requires the attentiveness of an ordinary prudent person in like cir-
cumstances. 112 The elements of the director's decision-making func-
tion-the director's fiduciary actions and to whom those actions
affect-depend on the state in which the entity is incorporated.113
In general, when a for-profit corporation becomes insolvent, the di-
rector's duty of care shifts from the corporation's equity holders to its
creditors.114 In a solvent, nonprofit corporation, the director should
make decisions that intend to benefit the corporation's purpose.115
However, unlike the for-profit director, when a nonprofit corporation
enters the zone of insolvency the law is not clear to whom the director
110. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act provides that a director fulfills his duty
of care by acting "(1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner the director reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation." REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr
§ 8.30(a) (1987).
111. See Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, Revising the Duty of Care of the Non-
profit Director, 36 J. HEALTH L. 183, 188-89 (2003).
112. See id. at 188. Some observers focus on the following actions/inaction that reflect failure
of the director to exercise oversight: (1) a weak system of corporate governance compounded by
large, multiple overlapping boards; (2) a low degree of fiscal responsibility and oversight practice
by the governance; (3) weak board composition; (4) multiple conflicts of interest between the
board and officers; (5) CEO domination of all board decisions; and (6) little board oversight of
corporate management and officers. Lawton R. Burns et al., The Fall of the House ofAHERF:
The Allegheny Bankruptcy, 19 HEALTH AFF. 7, 8, 21-23 (2000).
113. See Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 111, at 196-97 (recognizing that there are numer-
ous cases evaluating the decision-making function).
114. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991
WL 277613, at *1157 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (implying that the directors shift their fiduciary
duties to creditors to sustain the corporation); see also J. William Boone & Nadjia Bailey, Not-
for-Profits in Bankruptcy: Who Doesn't Love a Charity?, 23 BNA BANKR. L. REP. 1064, n.14
(2011) (noting that the duty of care usually shifts to creditors once a for-profit corporation is no
longer solvent).
115. In a similar, solvent for-profit corporation, the director is required to make fiduciary
decisions with the corporation's shareholders in mind to maximize its long-term profits. Non-
profit corporations do not have any similar equity interests. See Boone & Bailey, supra note 114;
see also Peterman & Morissette, supra note 11 ("[D]irectors of a nonprofit corporation owe a
duty to fulfill the corporate purpose of the organization.").
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owes this duty.116 For the purposes of this Note it is appropriate to
determine the director's duty within an insolvent nonprofit corpora-
tion using a similar rationale to the for-profit director's shift from
shareholders to creditors.11 7
Regardless of whether the nonprofit director's duty shifts when a
corporation enters the zone of insolvency, the director will be com-
pelled to make the appropriate fiduciary decisions in the interest of
the nonprofit corporation. The main difference between for-profit
and nonprofit corporations is that the latter is not formed to profit
from its operations and thus has no profit-driven motive.118 Nonprofit
corporations typically exist for charitable and other benevolent pur-
poses, and its contributors fund these entities because of such altruis-
tic aspirations. 119 Upon insolvency, if the nonprofit director's duty
does not shift from the corporation to its creditors, it would still be
acting as if it would have shifted because its creditors have invested in
the nonprofits' goals, not their own.120
More importantly, even if the decision-making duty of the nonprofit
director shifts solely to protect creditors,121 a nonprofit corporation
should still be the primary recipient of its director's decisions. Credi-
tors that contribute to a nonprofit corporation assume the same risk of
nonpayment as with their contributions to for-profit corporations. 122
Further, a nonprofit corporation's federal tax status permits the gov-
ernment to monitor a nonprofit's management to "ensure it is operat-
ing for the benefit of those whom it was formed and whose purpose it
serves. "123 Therefore, even if the nonprofit director's decision-making
duty shifts to the creditors when a nonprofit corporation becomes in-
solvent, the director maintains his ongoing duty to protect the purpose
of the corporation.
If it had the opportunity, the Third Circuit would find that the di-
rectors of the Home did not properly exercise their required duty of
116. "It is clear that when in the zone of insolvency duties of directors of public or private
corporations shift from profit maximization to protecting the assets of the estates for the benefit
of creditors. However, it is not so clear who the directors owe a fiduciary duty to in the case of
nonprofit corporations." Peterman & Morissette, supra note 11.
117. See id.
118. Id. (noting that a board of directors of a solvent corporation generally owes only a duty
to maximize its shareholders' profits, but nonprofit directors owe a duty to fulfill the corporate
purpose of the organization).
119. See id.
120. While the corporation is solvent, nonprofit directors owe a duty to fulfill the corporate
purpose of the organization. Id.
121. See Boone & Bailey, supra note 114.
122. Peterman & Morissette, supra note 11.
123. Id.
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care. Although there is no significant statutory difference between a
nonprofit and for-profit corporation,124 the directors, applying the rea-
sons of the oversight and decision-making functions above, violated
their duty of care to the Home. The fact that the directors did not
supervise the CFO, appoint a new administrator,125 or ensure that
someone recorded executive meetings was sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the directors did not adequately oversee the
Home.126 In addition, when the Home became insolvent, the direc-
tors ignored their continuing duty to make decisions in the interest of
the Home's corporate purpose.127 Their decision to delay bankruptcy
and instead provide a plan for Elder Care to absorb the Home's assets
violated the Home's best interests.128
To summarize, because the differences between for-profit and non-
profit corporations change the elements of the nonprofit director's
duty of care and the Home's directors lack of oversight in monitoring
the Home deepened the Home's insolvency, they violated their duty
of care. The duty of care requirements of nonprofit directors and the
evidence of the Home's demise indicate a gap in the claims for relief
against nonprofit corporate management. A claim of deepening insol-
vency is best suited to fill this void.' 29
124. The only difference between the corporate standard of care statutes in Pennsylvania is
the type of corporation mentioned. Compare 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 (West 2011) ("A
director of a domestic corporation shall stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and shall
perform his duties as a director . .. in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, skill and dili-
gence, as a person of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances."), with § 5712
("A director of a nonprofit corporation shall stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and
shall perform his duties as a director . . . in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, skill and
diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances.").
125. The failure to appoint a full-time administrator resulted in two separate deaths in the
home during Administrator Causey's absence. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Bald-
win (In re Lemington Home for the Aged), 659 F.3d 282, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2011).
126. It is evident that the directors did not reasonably inquire into potential issues, eventually
forcing the Home into further insolvency. See id.
127. "Lemington Community Services provide ... programs and services to the elder popula-
tion of Pittsburgh's East End that support the independent living; decrease isolation and prema-
ture institutionalization; promote mental, physical, and financial health and stability; and provide
referrals to other essential resources. . . ." About Us, LEMINoTON COMMuNrrY SERVICES, http://
www.lemingtoncs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&Itemid=3 (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2013) (explaining the Home's corporate purpose).
128. In addition to its failure to make decisions that benefited the Home, the directors' action
to consolidate the Home into Elder Care was an active decision to hurt the Home because it is
likely that the directors would continue to manage Elder Care in the same manner as the Home.
See In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d at 291.
129. This Note succinctly evaluated the Home's receipt of the duty of care because the Third
Circuit addressed the business judgment rule in its opinion. See id. at 291-93 (explaining why
the business judgment rule and in pari delicto did not apply).
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B. Lafferty's Potential Harms Fill the Existing Gap in Claims
Against the Management of a Nonprofit Corporation
In concluding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recog-
nize deepening insolvency as an independent claim,130 the Lafferty
court, drawing guidance from other Third Circuit opinions, identified
four potential harms that a deepening of a corporation's insolvency
would have on its operations.131 First, the court stated that the fraud-
ulent and concealed accumulation of debt could force an insolvent
corporation into bankruptcy, inflicting legal and administrative costs
that hurt its ability to run a profitable business.132 Second, the deep-
ening of a corporation's insolvency could undermine its relationship
with its customers, suppliers, and employees.133 Third, it could cause
the dissipation of corporate assets simply by prolonging an insolvent
corporation's life through bad debt.134 Fourth, the nondisclosure of a
corporation's deepened insolvency could harm shareholders because
it prevents dissolution of the corporation. 35
Academic scholars have offered opinions that discredit the Lafferty
court's "harms" and have asserted that deepening insolvency is, at
best, a measurement of damages,136 but their theories do not consider
the harms' effects on nonprofit corporations. Lafferty's harms are a
significant threat to nonprofit corporations, and a claim of deepening
insolvency is best suited to prevent damage.
Addressing the first harm, critics disagree with the Lafferty court's
belief that the incurrence of debt will have significantly hurt corporate
operations. 37 Mr. Sabin Willett believes that a plaintiff would have
difficulty proving that the fraudulent accumulation of debt itself was
enough to avoid bankruptcy. 38 He supports the argument by noting
that corporations will act fraudulently when they lack a valid purpose
in the marketplace.139 He reasons that when bankruptcy is inevitable,
with or without fraud, the plaintiff faces a challenge to meet its burden
of proof, and courts will view any offered proof with great skepti-
130. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 349 (3d Cir.
2001).
131. Id. at 349-50.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 350.
134. Id.
135. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 350.
136. See, e.g., Willett, supra note 39, at 564; see also Goodwin, supra note 12, at 41.
137. Willett, supra note 39, at 565; Goodwin, supra note 12, at 37-38.
138. Willett, supra note 39, at 565.
139. Id.
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cism.14 0 Mr. John Goodwin advances Mr. Willett's conclusion, stating
that the benefits of bankruptcy reorganization often outweigh the as-
sociated administrative and legal costs.14 1
Mr. Willett's and Mr. Goodwin's theories have a strong foundation,
and their breadth makes it easy to understand and apply in most situa-
tions, but their general proposition that bankruptcy is inevitable for
poorly functioning corporations does not include a situation in which
fraudulent action eliminates a corporation's options within
bankruptcy.
Courts should recognize a claim for deepening insolvency when the
misuse of nonprofit corporate assets forces a corporation to file for
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy reorganization is an extremely flexible tool,
and the bankruptcy courts have the equitable powers to allow a reor-
ganization or liquidation plan that considers the interests of both
debtors and creditors.142 In In re Parmalat, the court rejected a dairy
producer's deepening insolvency claims based on its incurrence of lia-
bilities and stated that the plaintiff's true claim was that the prolonga-
tion of its life through bad debt caused the dissipation of its assets.143
The court suggested that the only approach to a deepening insolvency
claim that could pass muster is if the corporate managers damaged the
corporation through the misuse of its assets. 144 The court further set
forth a requirement that a defendant manager must have had knowl-
edge of its fraud and used it to waste plaintiff's assets.145
The In re Parmalat approach considers a corporation's incurrence
of assets as well as its debt because a corporation acquires more than a
liability when it accumulates a note payable.146 The additional analy-
sis shifts a court's damage evaluation to a corporation's use of assets
that it obtained through debt, and therefore, the claim provides a bet-
ter view of a director's decision-making and creates a more formida-
ble proximate cause barrier for the plaintiffs to overcome.147
Although the In re Parmalat approach varies from deepening insol-
vency's traditional evaluation of whether the further accumulation of
140. Id.
141. Goodwin states that the bankruptcy proceedings provide protection from creditors, ac-
cess to lenient financing, and "leverage to force individual parties to support a viable plan of
reorganization." Goodwin, supra note 12, at 38.
142. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 560, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
143. Id. at 576.
144. Tanis & Fease, supra note 3, at 247.
145. In re Parmalat, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 581-87 (finding the plaintiffs failed to allege conduct
that would give rise to an inference of actual knowledge and did not adequately allege that the
defendant knew that management was committing fraud).
146. Tanis & Fease, supra note 3, at 245.
147. Id. at 245-46.
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corporate debt fraudulently prolonged a corporation's life and may
not apply solely to nonprofit corporations,148 evaluating how a corpo-
ration uses its assets is a beneficial methodology to recognize the im-
proper prolongation of a corporation's life. The In re Parmalat
approach uncovers additional value left in the corporation and mini-
mizes speculation as to whether filing for bankruptcy earlier would
have been beneficial.149
Further, the court in In re Parmalat commented on the use of deep-
ening insolvency when bankruptcy is inevitable for a corporation.150
In the case, the dairy producer could have reorganized its debt in
Chapter 11 and remained in operation; however, their directors
delayed filing, and the producer was forced to file for liquidation.15
Although the plaintiff's burden of proof is difficult, the In re Parmalat
court did not outright reject a claim for deepening insolvency because
the fraudulent incurrence and concealment of debt may have harmful
effects on a corporation destined for bankruptcy.152
Regarding Lafferty's second harm, Mr. Willett and Mr. Goodwin
believe that an insolvent corporation's continued incurrence of debt
does not initiate any further strain on the relationships with its cus-
tomers, employees, and community because by the time a corporation
is insolvent it has already strained its relationship with these groups
beyond repair.153 The authors claim that Lafferty's alleged harm is
contrary to reality and instead believe that a corporation that has
wrongfully acted through fraud or distressed borrowing wants only to
improve its reputation and quell the initial threats of bankruptcy.154
Moreover, they believe it is best for the parties harmed to embrace
the positive effects of bankruptcy.'55
The argument that deepening insolvency causes no future strain on
a corporation's relationships may be generally correct, but it is incom-
plete. Any strain on such parties originates from their dependency on
the corporation, and although both authors correctly imply that cus-
tomers, suppliers, and employees are interested parties, they fail to
distinguish the severity of their interest in a for-profit corporation's
148. This inquiry is beyond the scope of this Note.
149. In re Parmalat, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
150. See id. at 576.
151. Id.
152. The plaintiff must possess facts that could establish above a speculative level that the
company could have reorganized earlier and avoided bankruptcy. Id. at 572.
153. Willett, supra note 39, at 565; Goodwin, supra note 12, at 38.
154. Willett, supra note 39, at 565; Goodwin, supra note 12, at 38.
155. Goodwin, supra note 12, at 38.
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equity-the value of its stock-from a nonprofit corporation's current
and future value-its corporate purpose.
Nonprofit corporations do not have equity holders like for-profit
corporations. Because the purpose of nonprofit corporations is to fur-
ther the corporate mission, not to create a profit, its directors do not
owe the same duty to shareholders like for-profit corporations.156
Simply put, a nonprofit director is not obligated to please stockhold-
ers.157 The nonprofit director is, of course, still interested in the eq-
uity of the corporation, but he has a duty to fulfill the corporate
purpose even when the corporation becomes insolvent. 58
Furthermore, when a nonprofit director fraudulently takes on more
debt, his failure to adhere to the corporate purpose harms the benefi-
ciaries of the nonprofit more than those with equity interests. The
purpose of a nonprofit is grounded in a charitable, benevolent, or re-
ligious commitment.159 The period after a nonprofit corporation be-
comes insolvent is just as important as its solvent operation because its
beneficiaries160 still benefit from the entity well after it becomes insol-
vent.161 In addition, the beneficiaries may depend more on a non-
profit corporation's equity than shareholders because they have more
than money invested in the corporation: beneficiaries rely on the cor-
poration's operation and its contribution to the community, in some
instances, to live.162
Mr. Willett and Mr. Goodwin agree that Lafferty's third potential
harm, in which a delayed liquidation harms an insolvent corporation,
is not valid because there is no need to prevent the dissipation of an
insolvent corporation's assets. 63 When a corporation files for Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee liquidates corporate assets
and distributes the proceeds to its creditors.164 The authors also agree
that a delay in bankruptcy may cause harm to creditors because there
are fewer assets to distribute when a corporation eventually files for
156. Peterman & Morissette, supra note 11, at 3.
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
159. Peterman & Morissette, supra note 11, at 3.
160. The nonprofit beneficiaries are people or communities that benefit from the corporate
purpose. The Home's beneficiaries were the residents, the residents' families, employees, and
the Pittsburgh community.
161. For example, the Home remained in operation after it became insolvent. Official Comm.
of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the Aged), 659 F.3d 282, 285 (3d
Cir. 2011).
162. Because the residents lived in the Home after it became insolvent, the beneficiaries re-
lied on the Home for shelter, food, and other necessities. See, e.g., id.
163. Willett, supra note 39, at 566.
164. Id.
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liquidation, but if asset liquidation is inevitable, any delay "add[s] in-
sult only to death" because corporate life is already defunct. 165 Con-
sequently, they discredit any harm that originates from a corporation's
delayed liquidation because, at the point of insolvency, shareholders
are the last in line to recover proceeds and therefore are not likely to
receive anything from dissolution.166
Unlike the director of a for-profit corporation, the director of a
nonprofit corporation has a duty to manage the corporate assets in
furtherance of the organization's stated charitable mission and act in
accordance with the best interests of its beneficiaries.16 7 The directo-
rial duty of obedience embodies the duty to ensure a nonprofit corpo-
ration's charitable mission.168 The duty of obedience requires the
nonprofit director to carry out corporate objectives as specified by the
corporation's mission, which, for example, controls the issue of
whether a sale of all corporate assets promotes the purpose of the
nonprofit corporation.169 Because a nonprofit corporation may con-
tinue to operate past insolvency170 and the duty of obedience requires
that the directors make decisions in the best interests of the corporate
mission,171 a nonprofit corporation may suffer harm from the dissipa-
tion of its corporate assets because of a delayed liquidation.
Finally, in support of Lafferty's fourth harm, the director's failure to
disclose a nonprofit corporation's insolvency may cause significant
harm to the beneficiaries of its charitable purpose.172 In the zone of
insolvency, the for-profit director's duties shift from profit maximiza-
tion for shareholders to asset preservation for creditors. 73 However,
when a nonprofit corporation enters the zone of insolvency, the direc-
tor must determine whether he may shift his duties to benefit the
165. Id. (claiming that Lafferty's third harm is invalid).
166. Id. at 561; Goodwin, supra note 12, at 39.
167. Boone & Bailey, supra note 114, n.15 (citing Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family
Servs., 112 S.W.3d 486, 504 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)).
168. E.g., Manhattan Eye, Ear, & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1999).
169. E.g., id.
170. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
171. "While it may be appropriate, in certain cases, to solve financial difficulties by eliminat-
ing the organization's mission by selling its assets and then undertaking a new mission, . . . the
duty of obedience ... mandates that a [bloard, in the first instance, seek to preserve its original
mission." Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
172. Mr. Willett and Mr. Goodwin agree, on similar grounds as Lafferty's third potential
harm, that its fourth harm, the nondisclosure of a corporation's insolvency, is invalid because any
residual value left in the corporation will be distributed to its creditors. See Willett, supra note
39, at 561; Goodwin, supra note 12, at 39.
173. Peterman & Morissette, supra note 11, at 3.
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creditors or continue to fulfill the corporate mission. 174 Regardless,
the nonprofit director cannot push his corporation's beneficiaries to
the end of the asset distribution during liquidation, as a for-profit di-
rector does to its shareholders, because the nonprofit director must
adhere to his duty of obedience. 175 The failure to disclose a nonprofit
corporation's insolvency is the most likely of Lafferty's harms that
could result from deepening insolvency because the director of a non-
profit corporation has a duty to its beneficiaries, and without disclo-
sure, its beneficiaries will be last in line to recoup anything from
dissolution.
In sum, the Third Circuit's failure to elaborate in In re Lemington
Home for the Aged did not harm the decision's ability to affect the
future viability of deepening insolvency claims. By reversing the dis-
trict court, it not only recognized that the directors and officers may
have fraudulently prolonged the life of the Home, but also implicitly
recognized the differences between nonprofit and for-profit corpora-
tions and the associated duties of their directors. If the court had fur-
ther developed its opinion, it could have reasoned that because of the
differences in the duty of care and the potential harms associated with
deepening insolvency, an independent claim of deepening insolvency
could remedy the harm caused by directors of a nonprofit corporation.
V. IMPACT
The In re Lemington Home for the Aged decision could have sub-
stantial ramifications in allowing deepening insolvency claims against
directors of nonprofit corporations. Currently, courts have not estab-
lished a consistent view on deepening insolvency. 176 Some jurisdic-
tions that have distinguished the operations of nonprofit corporations
from for-profit corporations have addressed, and even rejected, deep-
ening insolvency.177 However, because of the inconsistencies across
the courts, there is little likelihood that deepening insolvency will ever
reach final determination as to nonprofit corporations. Deepening in-
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
176. See Richmond, supra note 55, at 131-32 (stating that deepening insolvency claims are
common, but not all courts recognize the claim and those that do treat the allegations as an
independent claim or just a theory of damages); see also supra notes 32-38 and accompanying
text.
177. Compare Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch.
2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency theory in any form), with Denckla v. Independence
Found., 193 A.2d 538 (Del. 1963) (noting the duty of obedience places outer limits on what an
organization may do by way of modifying activities).
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solvency's vacillating precedent 78 and the discordance of nonprofit
corporate law's regulations and policy have created significant barriers
that may prevent the issue from reaching the Supreme Court.
Directors must possess sufficient qualifications to effectively man-
age both for-profit and nonprofit corporations, but current qualifica-
tion standards prevent the courts from conducting detailed director
evaluation. For example, corporations tend to require that their direc-
tors have a broad knowledge base to represent various constituencies
and remain committed to the corporate mission.179 Although schol-
arly opinion has expounded on the qualifications of nonprofit direc-
tors,18 0 there is no bright-line standard beyond the duty to act as an
ordinary prudent person in like circumstances. 8' Moreover, the eval-
uation of director qualification standards is inconsistent because of the
numerous qualification exceptions recognized in litigation.18 2 Courts
must reexamine this standard before they evaluate directorial duties
across for-profit and nonprofit corporations.
In addition, the inconsistencies across nonprofit regulation and liti-
gation are attributable to the conflicting policy interests of the corpo-
rate fiduciary duty and charitable social utility. The main objectives of
the corporate fiduciary duty (and its counterpart, the business judg-
ment rule) is to ensure directors serve their principals' interests and
overcome the high oversight costs inherent in the corporate form.183
This traditional corporate structure is adequate for for-profit corpora-
tions because corporate shareholders act as a secondary oversight
tool.18 4 However, the additional safeguard of the shareholder is pre-
sent only in a for-profit corporation; a nonprofit corporation does not
have traditional shareholders and thus does not have principals with.
sufficient legal control to monitor director abuse.185 The lack of a sec-
ondary safeguard for the corporate structure potentially enables direc-
tors to shirk their fiduciary obligations if incentives to forego such
duties are as cost-effective as they were in In re Lemington Home for
the Aged.
178. See Magalhaes & Wolper, supra note 78, at *32 (noting most courts have rejected deep-
ening insolvency but others have found it a valid cause of action).
179. Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 111, at 206.
180. See, e.g., Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 111; Peterman & Morissette, supra note 11.
181. Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 111, at 187.
182. Id. at 205.
183. Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Non-
profit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & Emics 1, 34 (2005).
184. Id.
185. Id.
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Moreover, a charitable organization's goal to provide social utility
to its community undermines the efficacy of its corporate fiduciary
duty. The measurement of social benefit is ambiguous, which can
cause the nonprofit to deviate from its for-profit corporate structure
and prevent it from supervising its directors' actions.186 To success-
fully provide social utility, nonprofit directors must reconcile the cor-
porate mission with the need to generate sufficient net income to
continue operations.'87 However, a corporate mission is stated often
in general terms that lack the quantifiable framework required for
successful implementation, which further complicates a nonprofit cor-
poration's direction.188 The flexible standards of a nonprofit's mission
may also invite regulations that bring otherwise efficient business
strategies to a standstill.18 9 Because, to some degree, the fiduciary
duty and social utility goals of a nonprofit interfere with each other's
success, courts have struggled to consistently reconcile their respective
priorities. Thus, an effective nonprofit corporate evaluation must in-
volve a substantial appraisal of its own policy goals; otherwise, existing
circumstances may force it to sacrifice one goal to ensure the success
of the other.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will have a chance to rule on a
situation similar to In re Lemington Home for the Aged because of the
inconsistent views of deepening insolvency, the difficultly in develop-
ing an accountability standard for directors of nonprofit corporations,
and the differing policy interests involved with a distressed nonprofit
corporation. Furthermore, the number of lawsuits that reach trial in-
volving nonprofit corporations are significantly less than for-profit liti-
gation.190 Nonetheless, the current circumstances of the law should
not take anything away from the impact of the Third Circuit's opinion
in In re Lemington Home for the Aged.
VI. CONCLUSION
Deepening insolvency is a valuable claim for corporate owners and
creditors that have suffered from the fraudulent and continuous ac-
186. Id. at 36.
187. Id.
188. Greaney & Boozang, supra note 183, at 36.
189. Id. at 36-37.
190. For example, a search on WestlawNext produced sixty-seven nonprofit cases that dis-
cussed the duty of care for a nonprofit corporation. WESTLAWNEXT, http://www.next.westlaw.
com (search "'duty of care' 15 director! trustee & nonprofit charitable not-for-profit") (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2013). A similar search yielded 653 cases. Id. (search "'duty of care' /5 director!")
(last visited Mar. 22, 2013); see also Greaney & Boozang, supra note 183, at 37 nn.137-39 (per-
forming a similar Westlaw search).
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cumulation of debt at the behest of corporate managers. The In re
Lemington Home for the Aged decision is illustrative of a scenario in
which deepening insolvency is not merely "duplicative of other recog-
nized causes of action such as breach of fiduciary duty."191 The Third
Circuit's decision in In re Lemington Home for the Aged gave new life
to a misunderstood claim for relief when it did not foreclose the appli-
cation of deepening insolvency to the fraudulent operation of an insol-
vent nonprofit corporation.
Although the Third Circuit's decision leaves no quotable reasoning
to carry its principles forward, the decision places directors of poten-
tially insolvent nonprofit corporations in a more vulnerable position.
If read narrowly, nonprofit directors that engage in active mismanage-
ment, conflicts of interest, and intentionally deceptive practices could
potentially be subject to a claim of deepening insolvency.192 If inter-
preted broadly, which this Note suggests, a nonprofit corporation's
delayed bankruptcy filing should be grounds for liability in all in-
stances because the directorial duties within a nonprofit corporation
do not emulate the flexibility and deference of those within a for-
profit corporation. Indeed, In re Lemington Home for the Aged and
other precedent have indicated that deepening insolvency remedies
fraud that, when it occurs within nonprofit corporations, cannot be
corrected by other claims for relief.
191. Magalhaes & Wolper, supra note 78, at *32.
192. Id.
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